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Abstract
Ensuring compliance of organizations to federal regulations is a growing concern. This paper presents a framework
and methods to verify whether an implemented low-level security policy is compliant to a high-level security policy.
Our compliance checking framework is based on organizational and security metadata to support refinement of
high-level concepts to implementation specific instances. Our work uses the results of refinement calculus to express
valid refinement patterns and their properties. Intuitively, a low-level security policy is compliant to a high-level
security policy if there is a valid refinement path from the high-level security policy to the low-level security policy.
Our model is capable of detecting violations of security policies, failures to meet obligations, and capability and
modal conflicts.
Index Terms
Policy refinement, action refinement, compliance checking, security policies, obligation, access control
I. INTRODUCTION
RECENT regulations, like Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) [1] and Health Insurance Portability and Account-ability Act (HIPAA) [2], are having a broad impact in information technology (IT) operations at
many organizations. For example, SOX requires organizations to place adequate internal controls over
financial reporting. HIPAA requires sufficient safeguards to be placed for controlling access to medical
records. Moreover, these regulations require evaluations of safeguards and controls implemented by the
organizations to determine whether they are compliant with the requirements.
Tools to support automated compliance checking and establish formal properties are needed. Clearly,
this is a complex problem requiring knowledge not only about the high- and low-level policies but
also the available technologies, organizational requirements and processes, and system dynamics. Several
policy languages [3]–[6] have been proposed by researchers. However, they were not designed to allow
comparison of high-level and low-level security policies.
In this paper, we focus on the specific problem of checking compliance of an implemented security
policy to the high-level security policy of an organization. A high-level security policy may specify
1) description of security requirements over abstract concepts, and 2) obligations, dispensations, and
permissions. The low-level security policy gives specific security requirements over instances of abstract
concepts. For example, let us consider an organization with a business process called Order Management.
A rule in high-level policy may be that the Business Manager must protect the Order Management
process from unauthorized access. Rules in low-level security policy may specify access control list for
the purchase orders database used by the Order Management process.
Refinement of a high-level policy into a low-level policy may require instantiation of roles, refinement
of actions, and inference procedures. Many researchers have also proposed mechanisms for policy refine-
ment [7]–[9], i.e. to derive the low-level enforceable policies from the high-level policies. Instantiation
of roles has been studied extensively in context of access control [10]. The work of Backes et al. [11]
focuses on comparing two privacy policies. However, the problem of verifying compliance of a low-
level implemented policy to a high-level policy is not fully considered yet. In this paper, we propose a
mechanism based on refinement calculus [12] to fill this gap.
2In this work, we propose a policy refinement framework and action algebra that we apply for checking
compliance of security policies. The proposed action algebra forms the basis of action refinements. To
illustrate the need of action refinement to study compliance checking we now present an example. Let a1,
a2, and a3 be actions, s a subject, and o an object. Assume that allowing action a1 is equivalent to allowing
action a2 and disallowing action a3. If a high-level policy contains an access control rule (s, o,+a1) and
low-level policy contains access control rules (s, o,+a2) and (s, o,+a3) then the low level policy is not
compliant to the high-level policy. Intuitively, the policy compliance problem asks the question whether
the low-level policy satisfies the relevant requirements of the high-level security policy.
Our main contributions in this paper are development of an action algebra, a framework for policy
refinement using refinement pattern, and a definition of compliance based on the concept of model
checking. We describe a policy language that can model both high-level and low-level security policies.
The proposed policy language is an extension of the Authorization Specification Language (ASL) and
Flexible Authorization Framework(FAF) [5]. The extended language supports specification of obligations,
dispensations, and authorizations. We have applied the principles of refinement calculus to security policies,
and developed an action algebra that can be used to evaluate the correctness of action compositions. In
addition, we have developed a policy refinement mechanism that combines action algebra and the policy
language to refine high-level security policy into low-level security policies. Security policies are refined
using action refinement patterns and derivation rules. The refinement process results in a set of possible
low-level policies and corresponding system states. If the implemented low-level policy and the current
system state corresponds to a derived low-level policy and state then we consider the implemented policy
to be compliant to the high-level policy.
Rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II presents an overview of the proposed compliance
checking framework. Section III presents definitions of basic constructs. Section IV describes action
composition. Section V and VI describe our extension of Flexible Authorization Framework(FAF) and
the compliance checking process respectively. In Section VII we conclude and recommend future work.
II. COMPLIANCE CHECKING FRAMEWORK
We propose a compliance-checking framework, where all entities in the concerned organization are de-
scribed with ontological concepts. We define an ontology that models concepts like, subjects, permissions,
obligations, actions, protection objects, and metadata associated with them and with the organization. Our
compliance checking framework comprises of the following components: 1. an ontology, 2. instances of
ontology concepts (e.g., users, organization’s resources, roles, etc.), 3. a high-level security policy, 4. a
set of low-level security policies, 5. refinement patterns, and 6. compliance checking engine. An overview
of the compliance checking framework is shown in Figure 1(a). We now describe the components of the
proposed compliance checking framework.
We model security policies as locally stratified logic programs similar to Authorization Specification
Language [5]. The security policy language presented in this work can represent obligation, dispensations,
and authorizations. It also supports conflict resolution rules and policy refinement. Action refinement
patterns specify refinement of an action of type A into a composition expression (Section IV) formed
with sub-actions of A such that the constraints for satisfying any obligation of type A are preserved.
The compliance checking engine in our framework refines the high-level security policy by recursively
applying policy refinement rules. The refinement process continues until no new facts can be derived. The
refined policies generated by this process comprise of ground rules and system-state information (facts)
only. The set of all decision rules in a policy is called a decision view.
The low-level security policy and system information given as input to check for compliance is now
compared with the set of refined security policies generated. If the given system state satisfies post
conditions of applicable obligations and the decision view of input low-level policy implies one of
the possible decision views of high-level policy, we say that the given system complies to high-level
policy. However, if the given system is not compliant, the compliance checking engine may also detect
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violations of high-level policy and capability conflicts that prevent users from performing their obligations.
In Section VI, we discuss different types of violations and capability conflicts in further detail.
Rules in high-level policy contain composite actions. Composite action consists of two or more sub-
actions. We present an action composition algebra and Ontology based system model to check whether
the action compositions are well-formed.
In next section, we define constructs used to model system state and policy components like actions.
III. DEFINITIONS
This work uses ontologies to model the entities of our compliance checking framework. Our method
relies on this ontology to aid the compliance checking as described in following sections. We now present
our definition on Ontology used in this work.
Definition 3.1: (Ontology)
An ontology O is a 6-tuple (C,P, Ch,Ph, dom, range), where C is a set of classes, P is a set of properties,
Ch is the subclass hierarchy of C and Ph is the subproperty hierarchy of P . dom and range are functions
defined as dom : P → P (C) and range : P → P (C), where P (C) represents the power set of C. Let
c ∈ C be a class such that c ∈ dom(pi) for i = 1, . . . , k and let ri represent the range(pi) for i = 1, . . . , k.
We represent the class c as c((p1, r1), . . . , (pk, rk)).
Example 3.1: Let Computer be a class with properties os, owner, and name. Let the range of
property os be given by the class OS, the range of property owner be given by the class Agent, and
the range of property name be given by the class String. The class Computer is represented as
Computer((os,{OS}),(owner,{Agent}),(name,{String})).
Figure 1(b) shows class hierarchy of the concepts used in our framework. Our ontology is an extension
of the SUMO ontology [13] being developed by the IEEE SUO Working Group. The root node of our
ontology is the class Entity. The class Entity refers to the fundamental concept in the domain being
modeled. The class Object refers to physical objects. Binary relations that evaluates to true or false are
represented by class Predicate. Process is a class of active components that occur and have temporal
parts or stages. The class Agent represents something or someone that can act on its own. For example,
software agents and human users. Human agents are represented by the class Users. A set of users is
called a Group. A social position that is usually associated with some obligations and permissions is
called a Role. The class Action represents a set of operations that the users may perform. Properties of
the class Action are shown in Table I.
Definition 3.2: (Object)
Let O be an ontology. An object is an instance of any class c defined in O. Let c((p1, r1), . . . , (pk, rk))
4Property Range Semantics
agent Agent Agent that actively carries out the process
instrument Object Instrument is used by the process and is not modified
resource Object Resource is modified and used by the process
target Entity The entity acted upon or modified by the process
evidence Predicate Predicate is true after the action is performed.
subAction Action A distinguished part of the process
causes Process This process causes or triggers another process of type
specified by this property
prevents Process Processes of type specified by this property are prevented
by this process
TABLE I
OWL PROPERTIES OF CLASS ACTION
be the definition of class c where p1, . . . , pk are properties of class c. We describe object o as o((type, c),
(p1, v1), . . . , (pl, vl)), where o is a unique identifier, and for each pi there is a pj of c such that pi = pj
and vi is in range rj . We use the notation pi(o, vi) to represent the ith property of o and its value. Note
that type is one of the properites of o.
Example 3.2: An object of type Computer with os Solaris8, owner Alice, and name Hadar is
represented as Comp1((type,Computer),(os,Solaris8),(owner,Alice),(name,Hadar)),
where Comp1 is an identifier used to represent the computer object in question. Also note that Solaris8,
Alice, and Hadar are identifiers of other objects.
Definition 3.3: (Data System)
The Data System DS = {o1, . . . , on} is a set of objects.
Definition 3.4: (State)
The state of a data system DS is described by properties of objects in DS, that is {p11(o1, v1), . . . ,
p1k(o1, vk)} ∪ . . .∪ {p
n
1 (on, v
n
1 ), . . . , p
n
m(on, v
n
m)}.
For simplicity, in the rest of this paper, we represent pi(oj , vi) as xi = vi, where xi is a variable
representing the property pi of object oj . We say that the range of xi is the same as the range of pi. Let
X = (x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xh) be the set of variables that describe a state in DS. The mapping from X to
objects and their properties is maintained separately.
Alternatively, a state γ is defined as an assignment x1 := v1, . . . , xh := vh, where vi (i = 1, . . . , h) is
value of variable xi and vi ∈ ri.
Note that a system may satisfy more than one state representations. These state representations are
related to each other by refinement relation as we describe below.
Definition 3.5: (State Refinement)
Let γ = {x1 := v1, . . . , xn := vn} and γ′ = {x1 := v′1, . . . , xn := v′n} be two states. We say that γ′ is a
refinement of γ (γ ⊑ γ′) if v′1 ≤h v1, . . . , v′n ≤h vn. Note that the refinement relation (⊑) between states
is reflexive, transitive, and antisymmetric.
Example 3.3: Let γ = {x1:=Computer, x2:=Linux}, γ′= {x1:=Notebook, x2:=Linux} be two
state representations for an object. Given, Notebook ≤h Computer, we can say that state γ is refined
by state γ′ (γ ⊑ γ′).
Definition 3.6: (State Space)
A state space is a set of states.
Example 3.4: Let γ1 = {x1:=Computer, x2:=Linux}, γ2 = {x1:=Computer, x2:=Windows} be two
states. Then the set Γ ={γ1, γ2} represents a state space.
Description of a state space as illustrated in above example can be very tedious for large systems. In
many cases, we want to specify only the variables of interest. We allow a more concise description of a
state space in such cases as described below.
5Let DS be a data system that can be described by variables x1, . . . , xn, where range(xi) = ri (i =
1, . . . , n). A state space Γ described as (x1 = v1, . . . , xk = vk) (k ≤ n) represents the following set of
states:
{x1 := v1} x {x2 := v2} x . . . {xk := vk} x {xk+1 := v
1
k+1, xk+1 := v
2
k+1, . . . , xk+1 := v
m
k+1} x . . . x {xn :=
v1n, xn := v
2
n, . . . , xn := v
l
n} where, range(xk+1) = {v1k+1, . . . , vmk+1}, . . . , range(xn) = {v1n, . . . , vln}.
Example 3.5: Let us assume data system DS contains only two variables x1 and x2. Let state space Γ
be described as (x1:=Computer), and range(x2)={Linux, Windows}.
Then Γ = {x1:=Computer} x {x2:=Linux, x2:=Windows},
i.e., Γ = { {x1:=Computer, x2:=Linux }, {x1:=Computer, x2:=Windows} }
Intuitively, refinement of a state space means reaching a more specific state space. A more specific
state space has fewer states or contains states that are sub states of states in other state space. Refinement
of state space is now formally defined.
Definition 3.7: (State Space Refinement)
Let Γ and Γ′ be two state spaces. We say that Γ is refined by Γ′ (Γ ⊑ Γ′), if and only if ∀γ′ ∈ Γ′, ∃γ ∈ Γ
such that γ ⊑ γ′.
Example 3.6: Let us assume γ1 = {x1:=Computer, x2:=Linux}, γ2 = {x1:=Computer, x2:=Windows},
and γ3 = {x1:=Notebook, x2:=Linux} are states, and Γ1 = {γ1}, Γ2 = {γ1, γ2}, and Γ3 = {γ3} describe
state spaces. From definition of state space refinement, we observe 1) Γ2 is refined by Γ1 (Γ2 ⊑ Γ1), as
γ1 ∈ Γ1, γ1 ∈ Γ2, and γ1 ⊑ γ1 and 2) Γ1 is refined by Γ3 (Γ1 ⊑ Γ3), as γ3 ∈ Γ3, γ1 ∈ Γ1 and γ1 ⊑ γ3.
The refinement relation between states spaces is reflexive, transitive, and antisymmetric.
Γ ⊑ Γ (reflexive)
Γ ⊑ Γ′ & Γ′ ⊑ Γ′′ ⇒ Γ ⊑ Γ′′ (transitive)
Γ ⊑ Γ′ & Γ′ ⊑ Γ ⇒ Γ = Γ′ (antisymmetric)
Let Σ represent a non empty state space that contains all possible states of data system DS, and P (Σ)
be the power set of Σ. The pair (P (Σ),⊑) is then a partially ordered set. Let Γ and Γ′ be two elements
(state spaces) in P (Σ). The greatest lower bound of Γ and Γ′ is given as Γ⊓Γ′ = Γ∩Γ′. The least upper
bound of Γ and Γ′ is given as Γ ⊔ Γ′ = Γ ∪ Γ′.
Definition 3.8: (Restricted Subclass)
Let c((p1, r1), . . . , (pn, rn)) be a class. Then c((pi1, r′1), . . . , (pij, r′j)) is a restricted subclass, where at least
one of r′1, . . ., r′j is a subclass or an instance of r1, . . . , rk respectively. For all other r′i, r′i = ri.
Example 3.7: Consider the class Computer defined in Example 3.1. The restricted class Computer
((os,Windows)) represents the sub class comprising of all computers with operating system of type
Windows.
Definition 3.9: (Action)
Let ∆ and Γ be two state spaces. An action class A : ∆ → Γ is a state transformer from ∆ to Γ. An
action a : δ → γ is an instance of action class A only if δ ∈ ∆ and γ ∈ Γ. We call ∆ as the initial state
space and Γ as the final state space for action class A.
In the rest of this paper, for each variable Ai of type action class, we assume there exists corresponding
initial and final state spaces and we use symbols ∆i and Γi to denote them.
Definition 3.10: (Monotonicity of Refinement)
Let a : ∆ → Γ be an action. Let {δ} and {δ′} be state spaces such that ∆ ⊑ {δ} ⊑ {δ′}. If a(δ) → γ
and a(δ′)→ γ′, then γ ⊑ γ′.
Let a : ∆ → Γ be an action. Let ∆′ = {δ′1, . . . , δ′n} be a state space that refines ∆ (∆ ⊑ ∆′). Let
a(δ′i) → γ
′
i represent actions performed on states in the state space ∆′, and let Γ′ = {γ′1, . . . , γ′n} be the
state space after action a is performed. By definition of A, the state space Γ is refined by γ′i (i = 1, . . . , n).
This implies that Γ ⊑ Γ′.
For better readability we often write Γ ⊑ γ instead of Γ ⊑ {γ} in rest of the paper.
Actions are often composed of several other sub-actions. Composition may be performed by following
operations: sequence (;), choice (∨), and conjunction (∧). These operators give us the following language
6for expressing action composition:
A := a | (A) | A1;A2 | A1 ∨ A2 | A1 ∧ A2
where a is an atomic action, and A1 and A2 are subactions of A. The precedence order of the operators
in action composition is () > ∧ >;> ∨. We now describe properties of these operators.
The choice operator (∨) is a binary operator. If a1 and a2 represent two action terms then a1 ∨ a2
represents an action a that executes either a1 or a2. The choice operation is commutative and associative.
a1 ∨ a1 ≡ a1
a1 ∨ a2 ≡ a2 ∨ a1
(a1 ∨ a2) ∨ a2 ≡ a1 ∨ (a2 ∨ a3)
The sequence operator (;) is also a binary operator. If a1 and a2 represent two action terms then a1; a2
represents an action that performs a1 followed by a2. The sequence operator is not commutative. It is
associative and is distributive over the choice operator.
a1; {} ≡ {}; a1 ≡ a1
a1; a2 6= a2; a1
(a1; a2); a3 ≡ a1; (a2; a3)
(a1 ∨ a2); a3 ≡ a1; a3 ∨ a2; a3
a3; (a1 ∨ a2) ≡ a3; a1 ∨ a3; a2
Choice and sequence operators are the basic operators in our action algebra. The conjunction operator
is a composite operator. If a1 and a2 are two action terms, then a conjunction operation on a1 and a2 is
defined by a1 ∧ a2 = a1; a2 ∨ a2; a1. Conjunction operator is associative, commutative and is distributive
over the choice operator.
a1 ∧ a2 ≡ a2 ∧ a1
a1∧ (a1∨a2) ≡ a1∧a2∨a1∧a3
(a1 ∧ a2) ∧ a3 ≡ a1 ∧ (a2 ∧ a3)
Definition 3.11: (Action Refinement)
Let a : ∆ → Γ, a1 : ∆1 → Γ1 and a2 : ∆2 → Γ2 be actions, and a1 ⊕ a2 be an action composition. We
say that a1 ⊕ a2 is a refinement of a, i.e., a ⊑ a1 ⊕ a2, iff given any states δ ∈ ∆ and γ ∈ Γ, where
a(δ)→ γ, the action composition (a1 ⊕ a2)(δ)→ γ′, such that γ ⊑ γ′.
We assume that the action composition a1 ⊕ a2 used as a pattern to refine an action a in our model
is alway more restrictive then a. Therefore, it not possible for the refinement process to derive a when
further refining the composition a1 ⊕ a2.
Definition 3.12: (Atomic Action)
An action a is an atomic action if it cannot be refined by any other action.
Definition 3.13: (Action Tree)
An action composition tree is a node-labeled binary tree where each internal node is labeled with an
action and an operator pair, and each leaf node is labeled with an atomic action. The composition of
actions represented by the child nodes is a refinement of the action at the parent node.
In next section, we present types of action compositions that are allowed in this work. To provide
assurance about correct compliance checking and policy refinement, action compositions must be well-
formed. The concept of well-formed action composition is also discussed in next section.
IV. ACTION COMPOSITION
We first define types of action compositions categorized based on the depth of action tree.
Definition 4.1: (Simple Composition)
Let a1 and a2 be two atomic actions and ⊕ be an action composition operator. An action composition of
the form a1 ⊕ a2 is called a simple composition.
Definition 4.2: (Complex Composition)
Let a1 and a2 be two actions and ⊕ be an action composition operator. An action composition a1 ⊕ a2
is a complex composition if 1.) a1 and a2 are either atomic actions, simple compositions, or complex
compositions, and 2.) at least one of a1 and a2 is not an atomic action.
An action refinement pattern is a template for refining actions of a particular type.
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Sequence a ⊑ a1; a2 a ⊑ a1; [∆′]a2
Strict a ⊑ a1 ∧s a2 a ⊑ a1 ∧s [∆′]a2
a ⊑ a1 ∨s a2
Flexible a ⊑ a1 ∧ a2 a ⊑ a1 ∧ [∆′]a2
a ⊑ a1 ∨ a2
Fig. 2
COMPOSITION TYPES
Definition 4.3: (Action Refinement Pattern)
A refinement pattern RP(A) is an action tree with root node of action type (A).
We define additional types of composition in the context of refinement. We categorize action composi-
tions as basic or advanced based on absence or presence of constraints in addition to operator type. Note
that the advanced composition type is applicable only when it is required to perform both sub-action.
Hence, it is not applicable to choice operations.
Definition 4.4: (Basic Composition)
Let a1 and a2 be two actions. We say that a ⊑ a1⊕a2 is a basic composition if ⊕ is one of the operators:
sequence, choice, or conjunction as defined in Section III and there are no additional constraints.
Definition 4.5: (Advanced Composition)
Let a1 and a2 be two actions, ⊕ be an operator, and ∆′ be a state space such that ∆2 ⊑ ∆′ (or ∆1 ⊑ ∆′).
We say that a ⊑ a1 ⊕ [∆′]a2 (or a ⊑ [∆′]a1 ⊕ a2) is an advanced composition if for all states in ∆′ the
sub action a2 (or a1 respectively) can be ignored but for all states in ∆ − ∆′ both a1 and a2 must be
performed.
We also categorize action compositions as strict or flexible based on the feasibility to perform both
sub-actions in the initial state space or the feasibility to perform at least one of sub-actions in the initial
state space. Strict and flexible action composition types are not applicable for sequence operators as the
order of sub-actions is predetermined.
Definition 4.6: (Strict Composition)
Let a ⊑ a1⊕sa2, where ⊕s represents a composition operator. We say that a1⊕sa2 is a strict composition
if ∆ is constrained strictly to satisfy conditions such that both a1 and a2 can be performed in the initial
state for all δ ∈ ∆. In other words, ∆1 ⊓∆2 ⊑ ∆.
Definition 4.7: (Flexible Composition)
Let a ⊑ a1⊕a2, where ⊕ represents a composition operator. We say that a1⊕a2 is a flexible composition
if for all δ ∈ ∆, it is feasible to perform either a1 or a2 in the initial state, and both a1 and a2 must be
performed. i.e., ∆1 ⊔∆2 ⊑ ∆.
The above composition types may be combined. Figure 2 illustrates possible combinations. Constraints
for correct action refinements for various composition types are given in Table II.
Definition 4.8: (Valid Action Trace)
Action trace is an action composition where the composition is expressed using only the sequence operator.
Given an action tree and an action trace, the trace is valid with respect to the action tree iff the trace can
be derived from the root of the action tree using the properties of the operators.
Definition 4.9: (Well-formed Action Composition)
Let a ⊑ a1 ⊕ a2 be an action composition and let T1, . . . , Tn represent all the valid traces of the action
composition. We say that an action composition is well-formed if and only if for each trace Ti, Ti(δ)→ γ
such that Γ ⊑ γ, where ∆ ⊑ δ.
Theorem 4.1: Basic Composition a ⊑ a1; a2 is well-formed if ∆ ⊑ ∆1, ∆2 ⊑ Γ1, and Γ ⊑ Γ2.
8Composition Type
Basic Constraints
a ⊑ a1; a2 ∆1 ⊑ ∆ ∆2 ⊑ Γ1 Γ ⊑ Γ2
Basic and Strict Constraints
Let δ ∈ ∆ be the start state.
a ⊑ a1 ∨s a2 ∆1 ⊓∆2 ⊑ ∆ Γ ⊑ Γ1 Γ ⊑ Γ2
a ⊑ a1 ∧s a2 ∆1 ⊑ ∆ ∆2 ⊑ ∆
Γ ⊑ a1(a2(δ)) Γ ⊑ a2(a1(δ))
Basic and Flexible Constraints
a ⊑ a1 ∨ a2 ∆1 ⊔∆2 ⊑ ∆ ∆1 ⊓∆ 6= {} ∆2 ⊓∆ 6= {}
Γ ⊑ Γ1 Γ ⊑ Γ2
a ⊑ a1 ∧ a2 ∆1 ⊔∆2 ⊑ ∆ ∆1 ⊑ δ ⇒ ∆2 ⊑ a1(δ) and Γ ⊑ a2(a1(δ))
∆2 ⊑ δ ⇒ ∆1 ⊑ a2(δ) and Γ ⊑ a1(a2(δ))
Advanced Constraints
a ⊑ a1; [∆
′]a2 ∆1 ⊑ ∆ ∆
′ 6⊑ a1(δ)⇒ Γ ⊑ a1(δ)
∆′ ⊑ a1(δ)⇒ Γ ⊑ a2(a1(δ))
Advanced and Strict Constraints
a ⊑ a1 ∧s [∆
′]a2 ∆1 ⊑ ∆ ∆ ⊓∆
′ 6= {} ∆ ⊓∆′ 6⊑ δ ⇒ Γ ⊑ a1(δ)
∆ ⊓∆′ ⊑ δ ⇒ ∆1 ⊑ δ and ∆′ ⊑ a1(δ) and Γ ⊑ a2(a1(δ))
∆ ⊓∆′ ⊑ δ ⇒ ∆1 ⊑ a2(δ) and Γ ⊑ a1(a2(δ))
Advanced and Flexible Constraints
a ⊑ a1 ∧ [∆
′]a2 ∆1 ⊔∆
′ ⊑ ∆
∆1 ⊑ δ and ∆′ ⊑ a1(δ) ⇒ Γ ⊑ a2(a1(δ))
∆1 ⊑ δ and ∆′ 6⊑ δ and ∆′ 6⊑ a1(δ)⇒ Γ ⊑ a1(δ)
∆′ ⊑ δ and ∆1 ⊑ a2(δ) ⇒ Γ ⊑ a1(a2(δ))
TABLE II
CONSTRAINTS FOR WELL-FORMED ACTION REFINEMENT
Proof.
Initial State Trace Proof step
∆ ⊑ δ T1 = a1; a2 ∆1 ⊑ ∆ & ∆ ⊑ δ ⇒ ∆1 ⊑ δ (by transitivity) (1)
a1(δ)→ γ1 & Γ1 ⊑ γ1 (Definition of a1)
∆2 ⊑ Γ1 & Γ1 ⊑ γ1 ⇒ ∆2 ⊑ γ1 (by transitivity) (2)
a2(γ1)→ γ2 & Γ2 ⊑ γ2 (Definition of a2)
Γ ⊑ Γ2 & Γ2 ⊑ γ2 ⇒ Γ ⊑ γ2 (by transitivity) (3)
From (1), a1 can be performed in the initial state.
From (2), a2 can be performed after a1.
From (1), (2) and (3), T1 is a valid action trace.
T1 is a valid trace; therefore, a ⊑ a1; a2 is well-formed. ✷
Theorem 4.2: Basic and Strict Composition a ⊑ a1 ∨s a2 is well-formed if ∆1 ⊓∆2 ⊑ ∆, Γ ⊑ Γ1, and
Γ ⊑ Γ2.
Proof.
Initial State Trace Proof step
∆ ⊑ δ T1 = a1 ∆1 ⊓∆2 ⊑ ∆⇒ ∆1 ⊑ ∆ (by set inclusion)
∆1 ⊑ ∆ & ∆ ⊑ δ ⇒ ∆1 ⊑ δ (by transitivity) (4)
a1(δ)→ γ1 & Γ1 ⊑ γ1 (Definition of a1)
Γ ⊑ Γ1 & Γ1 ⊑ γ1 ⇒ Γ ⊑ γ1 (by transitivity) (5)
T2 = a2 ∆1 ⊓∆2 ⊑ ∆⇒ ∆2 ⊑ ∆ (by set inclusion)
∆2 ⊑ ∆ & ∆ ⊑ δ ⇒ ∆2 ⊑ δ (by transitivity) (6)
a2(δ)→ γ2 & Γ2 ⊑ γ2 (Definition of a2)
Γ ⊑ Γ2 & Γ2 ⊑ γ2 ⇒ Γ ⊑ γ2 (by transitivity) (7)
9From (4), a1 can be performed in the initial state.
From (4) and (5), T1 is a valid action trace.
From (6), a2 can be performed in the initial state.
From (6) and (7), T2 is a valid action trace.
T1 and T2 are valid traces; therefore, a ⊑ a1 ∨s a2 is well-formed.
For all states in ∆, both a1 and a2 can be performed. Hence, the constraints show that the composition
is strict. ✷
Theorem 4.3: Basic and Strict Composition a ⊑ a1 ∧s a2 is well-formed if ∆1 ⊑ ∆, ∆2 ⊑ ∆,
Γ ⊑ a1(a2(δ)) and Γ ⊑ a2(a1(δ)).
Proof.
Initial State Trace Proof steps
∆ ⊑ δ T1 = a1; a2 ∆1 ⊑ ∆ & ∆ ⊑ δ ⇒ ∆1 ⊑ δ (by transitivity) (8)
Γ ⊑ a2(a1(δ)) (Hypothesis) (9)
T1 = a2; a1 ∆2 ⊑ ∆ & ∆ ⊑ δ ⇒ ∆2 ⊑ δ (by transitivity) (10)
Γ ⊑ a1(a2(δ)) (Hypothesis) (11)
From (8), a1 can be performed in the initial state.
From (9), a2 can be performed after a1.
From (8) and (9), T1 is a valid action trace.
From (10), a2 can be performed in the initial state.
From (11), a1 can be performed after a2.
From (10) and (11), T2 is a valid action trace.
T1 and T2 are valid traces; therefore, a ⊑ a1 ∧s a2 is a well-formed composition. ✷
Theorem 4.4: Basic and Flexible Composition a ⊑ a1∨a2 is well-formed if ∆1⊔∆2 ⊑ ∆, ∆1⊓∆ 6= {},
∆2 ⊓∆ 6= {}, Γ ⊑ Γ1, and Γ ⊑ Γ2.
Proof.
Initial State Trace Proof steps
∆ ⊑ δ ∆1 ⊔∆2 ⊑ ∆ & ∆ ⊑ δ ⇒ ∆1 ⊔∆2 ⊑ δ (by transitivity) (12)
∆1 ⊓∆ 6= {} & ∆2 ⊓∆ 6= {} (Hypothesis) (13)
∆1 ⊑ δ T1 = a1 a1(δ)→ γ1 & Γ1 ⊑ γ1 (Definition of a1) (14)
∆2 ⊑ δ T2 = a2 a2(γ1)→ γ2 & Γ2 ⊑ γ2 (Definition of a2) (15)
From (12), Initial state δ is in either ∆1, ∆2 or both. Therefore, at least one of a1 and a2 can
be performed.
From (13), There are states in ∆ which provide a choice between a1 and a2.
From (12) and (14), T1 is a valid trace.
From (12) and (15), T2 is a valid trace.
T1 and T2 are valid traces; therefore, a ⊑ a1 ∨ a2 is well-formed. ✷
Theorem 4.5: Basic and Flexible Composition a ⊑ a1 ∧ a2 is well-formed if ∆1 ⊔∆2 ⊑ ∆, and for all
δ ∈ ∆ if ∆1 ⊑ δ then ∆2 ⊑ a1(δ) and Γ ⊑ a2(a1(δ)), and if ∆2 ⊑ δ then ∆1 ⊑ a2(δ) and Γ ⊑ a1(a2(δ)).
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Proof.
Initial State Trace Proof steps
∆ ⊑ δ ∆1 ⊔∆2 ⊑ ∆ & ∆ ⊑ δ ⇒ ∆1 ⊔∆2 ⊑ δ (by transitivity) (16)
∆1 ⊑ δ T1 = a1; a2 ∆2 ⊑ a1(δ) (Hypothesis) (17)
Γ ⊑ a2(a1(δ)) (Hypothesis) (18)
∆2 ⊑ δ T2 = a2; a1 ∆1 ⊑ a2(δ) (Hypothesis) (19)
Γ ⊑ a1(a2(δ)) (Hypothesis) (20)
From (16), Initial state δ is in either ∆1, ∆2 or both. Therefore, at least one of a1 or
a2 can be performed. This constraint preserves the semantics of flexible composition.
From (17), a2 can be performed after a1.
From (17) and (18), T1 is a valid action trace.
From (19), a1 can be performed after a2.
From (19) and (20), T2 is a valid action trace.
T1 and T2 are valid traces; therefore, a ⊑ a1 ∧ a2 is a well-formed composition. ✷
Theorem 4.6: Advanced Composition a ⊑ a1; [∆′]a2 is well-formed under following conditions: 1)
∆1 ⊑ ∆, 2) if ∆′ 6⊑ a1(δ) then Γ must be refined by a1(δ), i.e., ∆′ 6⊑ a1(δ)⇒ Γ ⊑ a1(δ), else performing
action a2 after a1 must lead to a state in Γ, i.e., ∆′ ⊑ a(δ)⇒ Γ ⊑ a2(a1(δ)).
Proof.
Initial State Trace Proof steps
∆ ⊑ δ T1 = a1 ∆1 ⊑ ∆ & ∆ ⊑ δ ⇒ ∆1 ⊑ δ (by transitivity) (21)
∆′ 6⊑ a1(δ) & Γ ⊑ a1(δ) (Hypothesis) (22)
T2 = a1; a2 ∆1 ⊑ ∆ & ∆ ⊑ δ ⇒ ∆1 ⊑ δ (by transitivity) (23)
∆′ ⊑ a1(δ) & Γ ⊑ a2(a1(δ)) (Hypothesis) (24)
From (21), a1 can be performed in initial state.
From (21) and (22), T1 is a valid trace, when a2 can be ignored.
From (23), a1 can be performed in initial state.
From (23) and (24), T2 is a valid trace, when a2 can be performed after a1.
T1 and T2 are valid traces; therefore, a ⊑ a1; [∆′]a2 is a well-formed composition. ✷
Theorem 4.7: Advanced and Strict Composition a ⊑ a1 ∧s [∆′]a2 is well-formed if the following
constraints are satisfied: 1) if ∆1 ⊑ ∆ and ∆ ⊓∆′ 6⊑ δ then Γ ⊑ a1(δ), 2) if ∆ ⊓∆′ ⊑ δ then ∆1 ⊑ δ
and ∆′ ⊑ a1(δ) and Γ ⊑ a2(a1(δ)), and 3) if ∆ ⊓ ∆′ ⊑ δ then ∆1 ⊑ a2(δ) and Γ ⊑ a1(a2(δ)), and 4)
∆ ⊓∆′ 6= {}
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Proof.
Initial State Trace Proof steps
∆ ⊓∆′ 6⊑ δ T1 = a1 ∆1 ⊑ ∆ & ∆ ⊑ δ ⇒ ∆1 ⊑ δ (by transitivity) (25)
Γ ⊑ a1(δ) (Hypothesis) (26)
∆ ⊓∆′ ⊑ δ T2 = a1; a2 ∆1 ⊑ ∆ & ∆ ⊑ δ ⇒ ∆1 ⊑ δ (by transitivity) (27)
∆2 ⊑ a1(δ) (Hypothesis) (28)
Γ ⊑ a2(a1(δ)) (Hypothesis) (29)
T3 = a2; a1 ∆ ⊓∆
′ ⊑ δ ⇒ ∆′ ⊑ δ (by set inclusion) (30)
∆2 ⊑ ∆
′ & ∆′ ⊑ δ ⇒ ∆2 ⊑ δ (by transitivity) (31)
∆1 ⊑ a2(δ) (Hypothesis) (32)
Γ ⊑ a1(a2(δ)) (Hypothesis) (33)
From (25), a1 can be performed in initial state.
From (25) and (26), T1 is a valid trace.
From (27), a1 can be performed in initial state
From (28), a2 can be performed after a1.
From (27), (28), and (29), T2 is a valid trace.
From (31), a2 can be performed in initial state.
From (32), a1 can be performed after a2
From (31), (32), and (33), T3 is a valid trace.
The constraint ∆ ⊓∆′ 6= {} ensures that the trace a2; a1 exists. This preserves the semantics of a
strict conjunction.
T1, T2, and T3 are valid traces; therefore, a ⊑ a1 ∧s [∆′]a2 is a well-formed composition. ✷
Theorem 4.8: Advanced and Flexible Composition a ⊑ a1 ∧ [∆′]a2 is well-formed under following
conditions: 1) ∆1 ⊔∆′ ⊑ ∆, 2) if ∆1 ⊑ δ and ∆′ ⊑ a1(δ) then Γ ⊑ a2(a1(δ)), 3) if ∆1 ⊑ δ and ∆′ 6⊑ δ
and ∆′ 6⊑ a1(δ) then Γ ⊑ a1(δ), 4) if ∆′ ⊑ δ and ∆1 ⊑ a2(δ) then Γ ⊑ a1(a2(δ)).
Proof.
Initial State Trace Proof steps
∆ ⊑ δ ∆1⊔∆
′ ⊑ ∆ & ∆ ⊑ δ ⇒ ∆1⊔∆
′ ⊑
δ
(by transitivity) (34)
∆1 ⊑ δ T1 = a1; a2 If ∆′ ⊑ a1(δ), (Case)
∆2 ⊑ ∆
′ & ∆′ ⊑ a1(δ) ⇒ ∆2 ⊑
a1(δ)
(by transitivity) (35)
Γ ⊑ a2(a1(δ)) (Hypothesis) (36)
T2 = a1 If ∆′ 6⊑ a1(δ) (Case)
Γ ⊑ a1(δ) (Hypothesis) (37)
∆′ ⊑ δ T3 = a2; a1 ∆2 ⊑ ∆
′ & ∆′ ⊑ δ ⇒ ∆2 ⊑ δ (by transitivity) (38)
∆1 ⊑ a2(δ) (Hypothesis) (39)
Γ ⊑ a1(a2(δ)) (Hypothesis) (40)
From (34), Initial state δ is in either ∆1, ∆′ or both. Therefore, at least one of a1 or a2 can
be performed.
From (35), a2 can be performed after a1.
From (35) and (36), T1 is a valid trace.
From (37), T2 is a valid trace.
From (38), a2 can be performed in the initial state.
From (39), a1 can be performed after a2.
From (38), (39) and (40), T3 is a valid trace.
T1, T2, and T3 are valid traces; therefore, a ⊑ a1 ∧ [∆′]a2 is a well-formed composition. ✷
Theorem 4.9: (Well-formed Complex Composition)
Let a1 : ∆1 → Γ1 and a : ∆ → Γ be composite actions a1 ⊑ a3 ⊕ a4 and a ⊑ a1 ⊕ a2 respectively. An
action composition a ⊑ (a3⊕a4)⊕a2 is a well-formed composition if the action compositions a ⊑ a1⊕a2
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and a1 ⊑ a3 ⊕ a4 are well-formed.
Proof. If a1 is refined by the composition a3 ⊕ a4, all traces of the a3 ⊕ a4 must be valid. Also, it must
be possible to perform a3 ⊕ a4 for all states in ∆1. From Def. 3.11, if a1 ⊑ a3 ⊕ a4, then for all δ ∈ ∆1,
a1(δ)→ γ1, such that,
(a3 ⊕ a4)(δ)→ γ34 and γ1 ⊑ γ34 (41)
Similarly, for all δ ∈ ∆, a(δ)→ γ, such that
(a1 ⊕ a2)(δ)→ γ12 and γ ⊑ γ12 (42)
Let a34 = a3⊕a4 be a state transforming function a34 : ∆34 → Γ34. The action composition a ⊑ (a1⊕a2)
is well-formed if all traces of a1 ⊕ a2 are valid even after substitution of a1 with a34. We now prove
validity of each possible trace.
Case 1:If a1; a2 is a valid trace then a34; a2 is a valid trace.
If a1; a2 is a valid trace then ∃ δ ∈ ∆, such that ∆1 ⊑ δ
and a1(δ)→ γ1, such that ∆2 ⊑ γ1 (43)
and a2(γ1)→ γ2, such that Γ ⊑ γ2 (44)
From (41) and (43), we get,
∆2 ⊑ γ1 ⊑ γ34 or ∆2 ⊑ γ34 (by transitivity) (45)
Let a2(γ34)→ γ234, then from (44) and (45), we get,
γ2 ⊑ γ234 (by monotonicity) (46)
From (44) and (46), Γ ⊑ γ234 (by transitivity). Hence, a34; a2 is a valid trace.
Case 2: If a2; a1 is a valid trace then a2; a34 is a valid trace.
Reasoning is similar to Case 1.
Case 3: If a1 is a valid trace then a34 is a valid trace.
If a1 is a valid trace, ∃ δ ∈ ∆ such that, a1(δ)→ γ1 and Γ ⊑ γ1 (47)
From (41) and (47), Γ ⊑ γ34 (by transitivity). Hence a34 is a valid trace.
Case 4: Refinement of a1 does not effect the trace a2. ✷
Now we give an example of an action composition.
Example 4.1: Let InstallFirewall, InstallAntiVirus, and Protect be types of actions.
Let a = Protect((target,$x)) be a restricted subclass of class Protect, where $x is an object
variable representing objects that satisfy the predicates type($x,Computer), and owner($x,Alice).
Composition of a may be described as follows:
Protect((target,$x)) ⊑ InstallFirewall((target,$x)) ∧
[$x((os,Windows))]InstallAntiVirus((target,$x))
This composition is an advanced composition using the conjunction operator. The sub-action Install-
AntiVirus must be performed if the operating system is Windows. Otherwise the user may choose not
to perform this action.
V. POLICY SPECIFICATION LANGUAGE
In this section we briefly describe our approach to incorporate action refinement in authorization policies.
For this we extend the Flexible Authorization Framework (FAF) [5] to express obligations, dispensations,
and refinement. FAF is a logic-based framework to express authorization requirements. Access control
permissions or denials are derived by a sequence of applications of the authorization rules. These sequence
include the propagation, the conflict resolution, the decision, and the integrity modules. In addition, it
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is ensured that every access request is either granted or denied, therefore ensuring completeness of the
authorization policy.
In our work, we provide extension of FAF, while preserving its properties with respect to complete-
ness and decidability. Our extensions, that include predicates to express obligations, dispensations, and
refinements in FAF will preserve the properties of locally stratified logic program. First, we give a brief
overview of FAF. The FAF syntax is built from constants, variables, and predefined predicates. The
constants and variables range over authorization objects, subjects, actions, and roles. FAF includes the
following predicates:
• cando(Xs, Xo, Xa)
• dercando(Xs, Xo, Xa)
• do(Xs, Xo, Xa)
• done(Xs, Xo, Xa, Xt)
• overAO and overAS for overriding predicates
• error for integrity viiolations
• AOH and ASH for object and subject hierarhies
For detailed explanation of these predicates, look at reference [5]. FAF rules are stratified by assigning
levels to the predicates and requiring that the head predicate’s level is equal or higher than the levels of
the predicates in the rule body. Formal properties of FAF, such as unique stable model and well-founded
model, as well as complexity analysis, are presented in [5].
In this work, we propose new predicates to express obligation and dispensation requirements. Table III
shows the levels of these predicates along with the original FAF predicates. First, we start with the formal
description of these concepts.
Regulations often specify obligations as one of their requirements. In general, we interpret obligations
as actions that users are required to perform to achieve specific goals.
Definition 5.1: (Obligation)
Let A : ∆→ Γ be an action type. An obligation o = oblig(s, A, q) is defined as a command to subject s
to perform an action of type A, such that the condition q is satisfied. Definition of an obligation is said
to be correct if Γ ⊓ Γq 6= {}, where Γq is state space representing all states in which q is true. Let δ be
the state of a given system. We say that subject s has satisfied obligation O if Γ ⊓ Γq ⊑ γ. If ∆ 6⊑ δ,
the assumptions made to perform the action of type A are violated. Violating the assumptions releases
the subject from the obligation. As this is not fault of the subject, it is considered to have satisfied the
obligation.
Definition 5.2: (Dispensation)
Let A : ∆ → Γ be an action type. A dispensation d = disp(s, A) is defined as an exemption given to
subject s from performing an action of type A.
Rules in our policy language consists of constants, variables, and predicates. They are defined as follows:
1) Constant Symbols: Every member of Obj ∪ T ∪ U ∪ G ∪ R ∪ A, where Obj is the set of objects,
T the set of types, U the set of users, G the set of groups, R the set of roles, A the set of action
types.
2) Variable Symbols: There are seven sets Vo, Vt , Vu, Vg , Vr , Va of variable symbols ranging over
the sets Obj, T , U , G, R, A, respectively.
3) Predicate Symbols:
a) A 3-ary predicate symbol, hasObligation. The first argument is a subject term, the second
argument is an action term, and the third argument is a boolean formula called post-condition.
b) A 2-ary predicate symbol, hasDispensation. The first argument is a subject term, and the
second argument is an action term.
c) A 3-ary predicate symbol, derhasObligation, with the same arguments as hasObligation.
The predicate derhasObligation represents obligations derived by using logical rules of
inference (modus ponens plus rules for stratified negation [14]).
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d) A 2-ary predicate symbol, derhasDispensation, with the same arguments as hasDis-
pensation. The predicate derhasDispensation represents dispensations derived by using
logical rules of inference (modus ponens plus rules for stratified negation).
e) A 3-ary predicate symbol, mustdo, with the same arguments as hasObligation and
derhasObligation. It definitely represents the actions that must be performed. Intuitively,
mustdo enforces the conflict resolution and obligation policy.
In addition, we allow use of cando, dercando, do, done, overAS, overAO, error, hie−,
and rel predicates as defined in FAF. Table III shows the strata of rules allowed in our policy to represent
obligations, dispensations and their refinement.
Level Stratum Predicate Rules defining predicate
0 S0 hie-predicates base relations
rel-predicates base relations
done base relation
1 S1 hasObligation body may contain done, hie- and rel- literals.
hasDispensation body may contain done, hie- and rel- literals.
2 S2 derhasDispensation body may contain hasObligation, hasDispensation, derhasDis-
pensation, over, done, hie- and rel- literals.
3 S3 derhasObligation body may contain hasObligation, hasDispensation, derhasObli-
gation, derhasDispensation, over, done, hie- and rel- literals.
4 S4 mustdo body may contain hasObligation, derhasObligation, hasDispen-
sation, derhasDispensation, done, hie- and rel- literals.
5 S5 cando body may contain mustdo, done, hie- and rel- literals.
6 S6 dercando body may contain mustdo, cando, dercando, done, hie- and rel-
literals.
7 S7 do in the case when head is of the form do(o,s,+a)body may
contain cando, dercando, done, hie- and rel- literals.
8 S8 do in the case when head is of the form do(o,s,-a) body contains
just one literal ¬do(o,s,+a).
9 S9 error body may contain mustdo, hasObligation, derhas- Obliga-
tion, hasDispensation, derhasDispensation, do, cando, dercando,
done, hie- and rel- literals.
TABLE III
OBLIGATION AND AUTHORIZATION SPECIFICATION STRATA
Definition 5.3: (Obligation Rule)
An obligation rule is a rule of the form:
hasObligation(s,a,q) ← L1& . . .&Ln
where s is a subject term, a is an obligation action type, q is a boolean formula composed with rel-
predicates and done literals, and L1& . . .&Ln are done, hie- or rel- literals.
Example 5.1: Let us assume that an organization requires computers to have firewall software installed
to be considered safe. The obligation ”Employees must protect computers they own from unauthorized
access” is then modelled by following obligation rule:
hasObligation($s, Protect((target,$x)), hasInstalled($x, $y)
& type($y,Firewall)) ← type($x,Computer) & type($s,Employee)
& owner($x,$s)
where $x, $y, and $s are variables, Protect is a sub-class of Action, Computer and Employee
are sub-classes of Object, type is a hie predicate, and target, hasInstalled, and owner are
rel predicates.
Let us assume that the data system contains two Employee objects and three Computer objects such
that the following predicates hold in the system state:
type(pc1, Computer), type(emp1, Employee)
type(pc2, Computer), type(emp2, Employee)
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type(pc3, Computer), owner(emp1, pc1)
owner(emp2, pc2), owner(emp1, pc3)
When above obligation rule is evaluated in the data system presented above, the results of evaluations are
($x=pc1,$s=emp1), ($x=pc2,$s=emp2), and ($x=pc3, $s=emp1). Applying the evaluation
results to the obligation rule creates following three obligations:
hasObligation(emp1, Protect((target,pc1)), hasInstalled(pc1, $y)
& type($y,Firewall))
hasObligation(emp2, Protect((target,pc2)), hasInstalled(pc2, $y)
& type($y,Firewall))
hasObligation(emp1, Protect((target,pc3)), hasInstalled(pc3, $y)
& type($y,Firewall))
Definition 5.4: (Dispensation Rule)
A dispensation rule is a rule of the form:
hasDispensation(s,a) ← L1& . . .&Ln
where s is a subject term, a is an obligation action type, and L1& . . .&Ln are done, hie- or rel- literals.
New obligations and dispensation may be derived from existing obligations, dispensations, hie- and
rel- predicates using inference rules called derivation rules. For example, a derivation rule can specify
propagation of obligation via subject hierarchy, and delegation of duties. Definition of dispensation and
obligation derivation rules follow.
Definition 5.5: (Dispensation Derivation Rule)
A dispensation derivation rule is a rule of the form:
derhasDispensation(s,a) ← L1& . . .&Ln
where s is a subject term, a is an obligation action type, and L1& . . .&Ln are hasDispensation,
derhasDispensation, done, hie- or rel- literals. All derhasDispensation literals appearing
in the body must be positive.
Definition 5.6: (Obligation Derivation Rule)
An obligation derivation rule is a rule of the form:
derhasObligation(s,a,q)← L1 & . . . & Ln
where s and a are terms of ST and OA respectively, q is a system state, and L1 & . . .& Ln are
hasObligation, derhasObligation, derhasDispensation, done, hie- or rel- literals.
All derhasObligation literals appearing in the body must be positive.
Definition 5.7: (Derivation View)
A derivation view is a finite set of derivation rules.
A. Policy Refinement
We use derivation rules to refine a high-level policy into low-level policy. Derivation is based on subject
hierarchy as in FAF, and action refinement patterns. A discussion of types of derivation rules is presented
below.
A. Derivation via subject-hierarchy
Propagation of obligations and dispensation can be achieved via subject-hierarchy. Dispensation derivation
rules expressing propagation via subject-hierarchy may have the following form:
derhasObligation(s,a,q) ← hasObligation(s’,a,q) & hie(s,s’)
derhasObligation(s,a,q) ← derhasObligation(s’,a,q) & hie(s,s’)
derhasDispensation(s,a) ← hasDispensation(s’,a) & hie(s,s’) &
L1 & . . .& Ln
derhasDispensation(s,a) ← derhasDispensation(s’,a) & hie(s,s’)
where L1& . . .&Ln are hasDispensation, derhasDispensation, done, hie- or rel- liter-
als. All derhasDispensation literals appearing in the body must be positive.
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Obligation derivation rules expressing propagation via subject-hierarchy may have the following form:
derhasObligation(s,a,q) ← hasObligation(s’,a,q) &
hie(s,s’) & L1 & . . .& Ln
derhasObligation(s,a,q) ← derhasObligation(s’,a,q) &
hie(s,s’) & L1 & . . .& Ln
where L1& . . .&Ln are hasObligation, derhasObligation, derhasDispensation, done,
hie- or rel- literals. All derhasObligation literals appearing in the body must be positive.
Example 5.2: Let us assume that a security policy specifies that all employees have an obligation to
protect computers they own. A manager is a type of an employee. Hence, managers have an obligation
to protect computers they own. This derivation rule is represented as follows:
derhasObligation($s2, Protect(target $x),q) ←
hasObligation($s1, Protect(target $x), q) &
isa(Manager, Employee) & type($s1,Employee) & type($s2,Manager) &
owns($s1,N1) & type(N1, Computer)
B. Derivation via action refinement
New obligation rules and dispensation rules may be derived from a high-level obligation or dispensation
rule, by substituting the action in high-level rule with its sub-actions as specified in refinement pattern.
We now discuss construction of derivation rules based on basic and strict action composition operators.
Let hasObligation(s,a,q)← L1 & . . . & Ln be an obligation rule, and let a1 : ∆1 → Γ1 and
a2 : ∆2 → Γ2 be the sub-actions of a : ∆ → Γ. Then the given obligation rule can be refined into
obligation rules for sub-actions as described below.
B.1 Distribution over sequence operator
Let a ⊑ a1; a2 be the refinement pattern for action of type a. An obligation rule to perform action a can
be refined into two obligations to perform sub-actions a1 and a2 with rules of following form:
derhasObligation(s,a1,q1) ← L1 & . . . & Ln
derhasObligation(s,a2,q) ← done(a1) & hasObligation(s,a,q)
where q1 = Γ1∩∆2. We constrain the post-condition of first obligation action a1 to satisfy pre-conditions
required to perform second obligation action a2.
B.2 Distribution over choice operator
Let a ⊑ a1 ∨ a2 be the refinement pattern for action of type a. Let R be the rule that derives obligation
to perform a. We know that if either a1 or a2 is performed the obligation is satisfied. Therefore, an
obligation rule to perform action a can be refined into either of the following two obligation rules R1 and
R2. Application of this refinement pattern to a policy P generates two refined policies P1 and P2. The
rule rule R in P is substituted with R1 and R2 to generate P1 and P2 respectively.
R1: derhasObligation(s,a1,q) ← L1 & . . . & Ln & ¬done(a2)
R2: derhasObligation(s,a2,q) ← L1 & . . . & Ln & ¬done(a1)
B.3 Distribution over conjunction operator
When an action a is refined by an action composition of form a1 ∧ a2, we refine the policy in two steps.
First, we substitute a1 ∧ a2 with the composition a3 ∨ a4, where a3 ⊑ a1; a2 and a4 ⊑ a2; a1. This allows
us to apply action refinement mechanism for choice operator as we described above. In second step, we
refine actions a3 and a4 in resulting policies using the action refinement mechanism for sequence operator.
B. Deriving Authorizations
Security policies may also contain authorization rules in addition to obligation and dispensation rules.
Moreover, the policy refinement mechanism presented in the previous section can be extended by adding
rules that derive permissions and prohibitions from predicates defined in obligation specification strata.
In this section, we examine authorization rules that may contain obligations and dispensations.
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From the perspective of refining a security policy, an obligation to perform an action suggests that the
subject must have permission to perform or execute the obligation action.
Definition 5.8: (Authorization Rule)
An authorization rule is a rule of the form:
cando(o,s,<sign>a) ← L1& . . .&Ln
where s is a subject term, a is a signed action type, sign is either + or -, and L1& . . .&Ln are mustdo,
done, hie- or rel- literals.
Example 5.3: Suppose an obligation decision rule is derived saying that subject s is required to encrypt
an object x. To be able to fulfill the obligation s must have permission to execute Encrypt action or
function.
cando(Encrypt((target,x)), s, +execute) ←
mustdo(s, Encrypt((target,x)), q)
Obligation to perform an action can also imply prohibition to perform certain actions. Prohibitions are
represented by authorization rules specifying a - sign for the action.
Example 5.4: Suppose subject s has an obligation to encrypt email messages that contain confidential
messages. To ensure compliance to this policy rule, the policy-refinement procedure can add a rule
disallowing s to send email if its contents are confidential. Such a rule may be expressed as follows:
cando(sendEmail((message,x)),s,-execute) ←
mustdo(s, Encrypt((target,x)),q) & type(x, EmailMessage) &
messagetype(x, PlainText) & hasClassification(x,Confidential)
To perform an obligation action, the subject s may need permissions on objects accessed by the
obligation action. Objects that are accessed but not modified are described by instrument property
of the class Action. Objects that are accessed and modified by an action are described by resource
property of the class Action. An obligation to perform an action can be refined into authorization rules
for instrument and resource objects as shown below:
cando($r, s, +modify) ← mustdo(s,a,q) & resource(a,$r)
cando($i, s, +read) ← mustdo(s,a,q) & instrument(a,$i)
Authorization derivation in this framework have definition same as in FAF [5]. It is given below to
provide complete description of this framework.
Definition 5.9: (Authorization Derivation Rule)
An authorization derivation rule is of the form:
dercando(o,s,<sign>a) ← L1& . . .&Ln
where o is an object term, s is a subject term, a is an action term, sign is either + or -, and L1, . . . , Ln
are either cando, over, dercando, done, hie-, or rel literals. All dercando-literals appearing in the body of
a derivation rule must be positive.
Definition of authorization decision rules in our policy refinement framework is different than that in
FAF. FAF uses a closed policy and creates a prohibition for all actions that are not explicitly permitted.
However, in policy refinement we assume that the refinement of high-level policy may not generate all
the positive authorization rules that may be present in the low-level security policy. We do require that
all negative authorization rules generated by policy refinement must be present in the low-level security
policy. We assume that the high-level policy does not contain positive authorization rules, and the low-level
policy may not override positive authorizations derived from the high-level policy.
Definition 5.10: (Authorization Decision Rule)
An authorization decision rule is of the form:
do(o,s,<sign>a) ← L1& . . .&Ln
where o is an object term, s is a subject term, a is an action term, sign is either + or -, and L1, . . . , Ln
are either cando, dercando, done, hie-, or rel literals.
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C. Conflict Resolution
Policy refinement must lead to decision whether a subject has an obligation to perform an action or
not. However, policies may generate conflicting rules. For example, a subject may have an obligation to
perform an action a and can also have a dispensation for action a at the same time. Conflict resolution
rules are added to deal with such situations.
A conflict resolution rule expressing that dispensations take precedence can be of following form:
derhasDispensation(s,a) ← hasDispensation(s,a) &
hasObligation(s,a,q) & L1& . . .&Ln
Conflict resolution rules that express obligation takes precedence are expressed as obligation decision
rules (Def. 5.11)
Definition 5.11: (Obligation Decision Rule)
An obligation decision rule is a rule of the form
mustdo(s,a,q) ← L1 & . . . & Ln
where s and a are elements of S and OA respectively, q is a system state, and L1 & . . . & Ln
are hasObligation, derhasObligation, hasDispensation, derhasDispensation,
done, hie- or rel- literals and every variable that appears in any of the Li’s also appears in the head of
this rule.
Separation of duty requires that for a particular set of actions in a transaction, no single individual be
allowed to execute all actions within the set. Separation of duty is often enforced with access control
policies. In the policy refinement model presented in this work, positive authorizations are derived from
obligations. A user must have permissions to perform actions he is obliged to do as discussed above.
However, the derived permissions must reflect separation of duty requirements. Hence, the obligation and
dispensation rules must be modeled to handle separation of duties.
For example, if the separation of duties require that actions a1 and a2 must not be performed by the
same subject. A subject obliged to perform a2 must be given dispensation on action a1. In such cases,
an additional obligation derivation rule can be stated to specify alternate subject that will be required to
perform action a1 and complete the transaction successfully.
derhasDispensation(s,a1) ← derhasObligation(s,a1,q1) &
derhasObligation(s,a2,q2) & L1 & . . . & Ln
derhasObligation(s’,a1,q1) ← derhasDispensation(s,a1) & L′1 & . . .& L′n
where s′ is a subject term defined in body of the rule.
In addition, a policy may have modal authorization conflicts, i.e., policy refinement may generate both
positive and negative authorizations on same object for a subject. For example, policy refinement may
derive positive authorizations for a subject on objects required to perform his/her obligations. However,
there may be another rule in the policy prohibiting access to the required object. In this case, a conflict
resolution rule may be defined to allow the subject to access required objects. In general, conflict resolution
rules for authorizations are modeled as authorization decision rules (Def. 5.10).
Definition 5.12: (Decision View)
A decision view is a finite set of decision rules.
Definition 5.13: (Integrity Rule)
An integrity rule is of the following form:
error ← L1& . . .&Ln
where L1, . . . , Ln are mustdo, hasObligation, derhasObligation, hasDispensation, derhasDispensation, do,
cando, dercando, done, hie-, and rel- literals.
Definition 5.14: (Policy)
A policy P = (R,DS,E) is a set of rules R = H∪A∪M characterized by its scope DS and environment
E, where H is a set of obligation rules and dispensation rules, A is a set of authorization rules, and M is
a set of propagation rules, conflict resolution rules, and integrity rules. Scope specifies set of target objects
to which the policy is applicable, and environment specifies compliance verification context information
like date, time, location, subject, etc.
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Example 5.5: Let us now consider an example illustrating application of derivation rules, and decision
rules for policy refinement. Consider the following security policy:
hasObligation($s, Protect((target, $x)), true) ←
type($s, Employee) & owns($s,$x) & type($x, Computer)
hasDispensation($s, InstallFirewall((target, $x))) ←
type($s, Employee) & owns($s,$x) & type($x,Computer) &
hasRole($s, Manager)
mustdo($s, $a,$q) ← derhasObligation($s,$a, $q) &
¬ derhasDispensation($s, $a)
Let the refinement for action Protect be defined by following action composition:
Protect((target, $x)) ⊑ InstallFirewall((target, $x)) ∧
InstallAntiVirus((target, $x))
Let the following predicates hold in system state:
type(Alice, Employee), hasRole(Alice, Manager),
owns(Alice, NB1), type(NB1, Computer)
To refine the security policy, we first apply the derivation rules to derive all predicates in stratum OS2,
followed by derivation of all predicates in stratum OS3, and so on. We first, evaluate the variables in
obligation rules and dispensation rules using the system state. For above security policy, following rules
are derived after evaluation:
hasObligation(Alice, Protect((target, NB1)), true) ←
type(Alice, Employee) & owns(Alice,NB1) & type(NB1, Computer)
hasDispensation(Alice, InstallFirewall((target, NB1))) ←
type(Alice, Employee) & owns(Alice,NB1) & type(NB1,Computer)
& hasRole(Alice, Manager)
We now apply derivation rules, e.g., derivation rules for policy refinement by action refinement. By
refining action protect, we obtain following rules:
derhasObligation(Alice, InstallFirewall((target, NB1)), true) ←
type(Alice,Employee) & owns(Alice,NB1) & type(NB1, Computer)
derhasObligation(Alice, InstallAntiVirus((target, NB1)), true) ←
type(Alice, Employee) & owns(Alice,NB1) & type(NB1, Computer)
No new predicates can be further derived in this level. Hence, we now apply the decision rules to
obtain predicates in higher stratum. Since, both predicates derhasObligation(Alice, Install-
Firewall((target, NB1)), true) and derhasDispensation(Alice, InstallFirewall
((target, NB1))) hold, a mustdo predicate for Alice to perform the action InstallFirewall
cannot be derived. However, a mustdo predicate for InstallAntiVirus action is derived from the
following instance of decision rule:
mustdo(Alice, InstallAntiVirus((target, NB1)),true) ←
derhasObligation(Alice, InstallAntiVirus((target, NB1)),true)
& ¬ derhasDispensation(Alice, InstallAntiVirus((target, NB1)))
VI. COMPLIANCE
To check compliance, we compare a high-level security policy with a low-level security policy in context
of a data system. The set of do and mustdo ground predicates that can be derived from a security policy
and a data system is called ground decision view.
Definition 6.1: (Compliance)
A low-level policy Pl is compliant to a higher-level policy Ph for a given DS, if there exists a (Ph, DS)ref ,
such that (Pl, DS)⇒ (Ph, DS)ref , where DS is the data system, (Pl, DS) represents the ground decision
view of low-level security policy, and (Ph, DS)ref represents the ground decision view of refined high-level
security policy. We assume that Ph does not contain any positive authorization rules
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Algorithm 1 describes the steps needed to check compliance of a give low-level policy and system
state to a given high-level policy. First, the algorithm decision view of low-level security policy. The
low-level policy is a stratified logic program and can be evaluated in polynomial time [5]. We then refine
the high-level policy. The refinement process can lead to multiple refinements of high-level policies due
to action refinement over the choice choice operator (∨) and conjunction operator (∧). The process of
refining low-level policies is analogous to a top-down tree traversal, where each internal node of the tree
represents the refinement stage at which an action is refined into a composition with choice operator or
conjunction operator. The leafs of the tree represent derivation of refined policies with atomic actions.
Therefore, the complexity of the policy refinement can be seen as exponential in terms of height of this
evaluation tree, which corresponds to number of time action refinement has to be applied to reach atomic
actions. Finally, the algorithm checks for compliance by searching for a refinement of high-level policy
such that all the access control and obligation requirements specified in the refined policy are satisfied by
the low-level policy or current system state.
A given refinement of high-level policy and low-level policy can also be compared to detect conflicts
among them. We categorize conflicts between a (high-level) security policy and system state (low-level
policy and object properties) into following four categories:
Definition 6.2: (Modal Authorization Violations)
A modal violation occurs when a high level policy has granted authorization but a low level policy denies
authorization.
Let Rh be a authorization decision rule do(s, o,−a) ← L1& . . .&Łn in refinement of high level policy
Algorithm 1: Compliance checking algorithm
input : High-level security policy Ph, Low-level security policy Pl, Data System DS, Refinement Patterns RP, Current State σ
output: true if Pl and σ are compliant to Ph, otherwise false
// Generate ground decision view of Pl give a data system DS
Evaluate the variables in Pl.
Instantiate the variables in Pl to derive ground rules.
Apply derivation rules and conflict resolution rules until no new fact is generated.
Apply Integrity rules. If errors are found report that policy Pl is inconsistent.
// Generate all ground decision views of Ph given a data system DS
// Note that multiple decision views may be derived from Ph.
Evaluate the variables in Ph.
repeat
Instantiate the variables in Ph to derive ground rules.
Apply derivation rules, and conflict resolution rules until no new fact is generated.
Apply Integrity rules. If errors are found report that policy Ph is inconsistent.
until no new fact is generated
// Compare ground decision views, which consists of authorization obligation decision views.
compliant ← false
foreach decision view derived from Ph do
found ← true
// Compare authorization decision views.
Let Dh be the set of do predicates derived from Ph and are applicable in DS and current state σ.
Let Dl be the set of do predicates derived from Pl and are applicable in DS and current state σ.
if Dh 6⊆ Dl then
found ← false
// Compare obligation decision views
Let Mh be the set of mustdo predicates derived from Ph and are applicable in DS and current state σ.
Let Ml be the set of mustdo predicates derived from Pl and are applicable in DS and current state σ.
(Note that Pl may have no means to enforce obligations or Pl may not contain obligations. In such cases, we consider Ml to be empty and
check for satisfaction of obligations in Mh.)
foreach predicate mustdo(s,a,q) in Mh do
Let ea be the effect of action a asserted by ontology.
Compute ea by evaluating effect(a, ea) given data system DS
if not ((mustdo(s,a,q) in Ml) OR (σ ⇒ q and σ ⇒ ea)) then
found ← false
compliant ← compliant OR found
if compliant then
break
return compliant
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Ph, and Rl be an authorization decision rule do(s, o,+a)← L′1& . . .&Ł′m in low-level policy Pl. Rh and
Rl have a modal conflict if L1& . . .&Łn and L′1& . . .Ł′m can be true simultaneously for any system state
G.
A modal authorization violation may be modeled with rules of following form:
error ← ((Pl, DS)⇒ do(s, o, +a)) & ((Ph, DS)⇒ do(s, o, −a))
Definition 6.3: (Obligation Violations)
An obligation violation occurs, when a subject either does not perform his or her obligations or does not
perform obligations correctly.
Let mustdo(s, a, q) ← L1& . . .&Ln be an obligation decision rule, where s is a subject, a is an action,
q is a post condition, and L1& . . .&Ln is a precondition. Let ea be an effect of action a asserted by the
ontology. When L1& . . .&Ln holds but ea & q is not satisfied, an obligation violation is indicated.
We assume that prior to the time of compliance checking the subject had sufficient time to perform
obligations satisfactorily. Detection of obligation violation may be modeled with rule of following form:
error ← L1& . . .&Ln & ¬ea & ¬q
Definition 6.4: (Resource Capability Conflict)
Resource capability conflict occurs when resources required to perform an obligation does not exist.
Let DS = (O, I) be a data system, where O is an ontology and I is set of objects in the system. A
resource capability conflict may be modeled with rules of following form:
error ← mustdo(s,a,q) & resource(a,r) & (r 6∈ I)
Definition 6.5: (Modal Capability Conflict)
Modal capability conflict occurs when an obligation requires access to certain resources, and the subject
does not have the requisite permissions.
error ← mustdo(s,a,q) & ¬do(a,s,+execute)
Theorem 6.1: Obligation and Authorization specification is a locally stratified logic program, thus
preserves the desirable properties given in Theorem 1 of [5].
Proof Sketch: Authorization specification language has been extended by introducing new predicates.
Table III shows that all atoms in the specification can be assigned a rank such that no atom depends on
an atom of greater rank or depends negatively on one on equal or greater rank in any instantiated rule.
Proof of this theorem is similar to the proof of Theorem 1 of [5]. ✷
We assume that the high-level policy does not contain positive authorization rules. Any authorizations
derived from Ph must be derived from obligation and derivation rules. If Dh 6⊆ Dl then low-level security
policy is prohibiting some users from performing their obligations. This is a case of modal capability
conflict and the algorithm correctly returns false.
Obligations derived from the high-level security policy must occur in a compliant low-level policy or
the obligations must have been satisfied. If the obligation is satisfied, the obligation postcondition must
be true and the effect of obligation action must also be true. The compliance checking algorithm returns
false, when both the above conditions are not satisfied.
Theorem 6.2: Compliance checking algorithm (Alg. 1) terminates and the algorithm returns false if
low-level security policy and system state is not compliant with the high-level security policy.
Proof Sketch: The compliance checking algorithm computes decision view of the high-level and low-
level policy by evaluating their obligation and authorization specifications, which are locally stratified logic
programs. The herbrand base of the obligation and authorization specification is finite. Also, the variables
used in the rule head are bounded by the variables in the body of the rule. The policy refinement process
performs substitution of rules in the high-level policy until actions can not be further refined. Action
refinements in our framework cannot contain loops as the refinement are always more specific. Therefore
the number of times action refinement may be performed is finite. We consider a finite DS, thus only a
finite number of instantiations may occur; therefore Alg. 1 terminates.
If the low-level security policy violates the high-level security policy, the algorithm detects the violation
and returns false. This is proved by contradiction. Let us assume that the low-level security policy Pl
violates high-level security policy Ph and the compliance checking algorithm returns true. The algorithm
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can return true only if 1) Dh ⊆ Dl, and 2) for every mustdo(s,a,q) predicate in Mh, either mustdo(s,a,q)
is in Ml or (σ ⇒ q and σ ⇒ ea). The decision views (Pl, DS) and (Ph, DS)ref contain only ground
mustdo and do predicates. If (σ ⇒ q and σ ⇒ ea), the obligation a has already been satisfied in Pl.
As discussed the remainder of mustdo and do predicates also occur in (Ph, DS)ref . Hence, the low-level
security policy is compliant to high-level security policy. This is in contradiction to initial assumption. ✷
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we proposed a framework and techniques to evaluate whether a low-level, implemented
security policy is compliant to a high-level policy. Our method uses organizational and security meta-
data and a set of well-defined operations to generate valid refinements of a given high-level policy. The
implemented policy is compared to these refinements to verify whether it is compliant to the high-level
policy. The correctness of the compliance is based on the properties of the refinement, that is the well-
formedness of the refinement operators and the validity of the compositions.
Although the basic concept presented in this work have been proposed and used in other fields of
research and development, e.g., software engineering and programming languages, their relevance for
information security have not yet been fully evaluated. Our aim is to build upon these technologies to
establish formal properties of security policies. This work constitutes our initial efforts on incorporating
results from software refinement [15], [16], requirement analysis, and process algebra [17]–[23] in security
policy verification. Our ongoing work includes analysis of more complex policy refinements, usage of
extensive organizational meta-data, and bottom-up compliance verification. Our goal is to develop methods
and tools that will aid and simplify the human evaluation process for compliance checking.
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